Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court by Levin, Marshall A.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 3
Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court
Marshall A. Levin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marshall A. Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court, 34 Md. L. Rev. 341 (1974)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol34/iss3/3
Maryland Law Review
VOLUME XXXIV 1974 NUMBER 3
© Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc., 1974
GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN A FAMILY COURT
HON. MARSHALL A. LEVIN*
Initially, the thrust of this article was confined to a consider-
ation of the feasibility of the employment of a guardian ad litem'
for the protection of children in custody disputes. However, an
analysis of the need for this device exposes the larger problem of
the general lack of adequate judicial consideration of the interests
of the child in domestic matters. The question of how best to
protect the child in such troublous circumstances has become
critical, particularly with the advent of the Maryland "no fault"
divorce which may well tend to further submerge or neglect the
interest of the child. It, therefore, became evident that the utili-
zation of a guardian ad litem in custody matters was only part of
a larger solution which might well encompass the establishment
of a Family Court to provide a unified and logical approach to the
multiple ills that sometimes beset a family. The guardian ad
litem would be the principle mechanism within the Family Court
for the protection of the interests of the child. Additionally, the
Family Court would offer voluntary counselling and conciliation
services to provide guidance for the parents and, thereby, safe-
guard the interests of children.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
Traditionally, disputed matters of custody, visitation, and
child support (and sometimes adoption) are determined by Mary-
* Associate Judge, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. B. A., University of Virginia,
1941; J. D., Harvard University, 1947.
1. The phrase "guardian ad litem" is used in this article to mean the legal represent-
ative of children who are the subject of dispute in matters of custody, visitation, child
support and sometimes adoption. It may no longer be the most appropriate description
since the provision for appointment of a guardian has been deleted from the Maryland
Rules. See MD. R. P. 205e, Committee Note; MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-
201(c) (1974) (definition of "guardian"). However, the phrase has achieved widespread use
in both the law and legal literature dealing with custody problems, and therefore, it shall
be used in this article.
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land equity courts2 in a setting where the attorneys3 for the oppos-
ing parents4 project the antagonistic positions of their respective
clients. In a custody case, the parties and their witnesses will
testify in an effort to convince the Chancellor that one parent is
more "fit" than the other to care for the child. The child' becomes
the ultimate "prize" of the contest. Thus, one parent will, in
testimony, venomously attack the other parent, many times in
front of the children,' in order to establish the other's "bad
points." In the process, the ultimate "winner" will have done
irreparable harm to the "loser" and, even worse, to the children.'
The situation becomes further exacerbated because the "loser"
may often find his or her visitation opportunities diminished in
direct relation to the "success" of such a court attack.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently instructed
the Chancellor that: "The legal standard to be applied in custody
cases is quite clear, the best interest of the child being the deter-
minative factor in making the award."' However, neither attor-
ney specifically represents the child. In fact, the success of each
attorney rests upon the dispute being resolved in favor of his
particular client, rather than upon obtaining a disposition most
in accordance with the "best interest" of the child. It is, therefore,
suggested that without meaningful representation of the interests
of the child, the adversary system cannot properly effectuate the
2. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-602(a) (1974); cf., Stern v. Homer,
22 Md. App. 421, 324 A.2d 134 (1974). In Baltimore City, these matters are decided in
Circuit Court Number Two which is the Domestic Relations Court. In the Maryland
counties, domestic matters are decided in the Circuit Court and are sometimes designated
"in equity" or "domestic" to distinguish them from other matters also determined in these
courts. See Jones v. Jones, 259 Md. 336, 343-44, 270 A.2d 126, 130 (1970).
3. Church, Counsellor-at-Law, A Game of Chess?, TRIAL, Sept./Oct. 1972, at 27.
Attorneys, schooled in the "special skills" of psychological and family law, can "trounce
success-hardened big-trial lawyers in domestic courts." Id.
4. The contest may also involve parties other than the parents, such as relatives,
welfare and social agencies, and foster parents.
5. A person over the age of eighteen is an adult in Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1,
§ 24 (Supp. 1973); see Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 315 A.2d 520 (1974).
6. The Chancellor may, at his discretion, exclude the children from the courtroom.
Interestingly, it is generally-the Chancellor, rather than the parents, who perceives the
necessity for such exclusion.
7. It is painful for a judge to hear one parent brand the other as a "whore" or a
"rotten drunk," and, thus, one can imagine the effect on impressionable youngsters sitting
in a courtroom.
8. Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 11, 261 A.2d 759, 760 (1970). See Omdoff v.
Omdoff, 252 Md. 519, 250 A.2d 627 (1969); Shanbarker v. Dalton, 251 Md. 252, 247 A.2d
278 (1968); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 22 Md. App. 519, 323 A.2d 632 (1974); Deckman v.
Deckman, 15 Md. App. 553, 292 A.2d 112 (1972); Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1,
276 A.2d 698 (1971); Widdoes v. Widdoes, 12 Md. App. 225, 278 A.2d 100 (1971); Mullinix
v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 278 A.2d 674 (1971).
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legal test of what is in the "best interest" of the child.9
In many states,'" additional resources in the form of agencies
are available to aid the court in deciding controversies pertaining
to custody. These agencies will perform the functions of investiga-
tion, evaluation and recommendation. In Baltimore City, the
Adoption and Custody Unit of the Department of Juvenile Serv-
ices will, at the request (or order) of the court, undertake investi-
gations and make written" recommendations to the court." The
9. The following letters, actually received by the author, painfully demonstrate the
inadequacy of the adversary system in considering the best interest of the child:
Tommy
"Judge Levin:
Tommy doesn't want either of his parents to know he wishes to meet with you, hence
his reason for corresponding through me.
I have offered to help him pursue a course of action designed to get the legal system to
recognize the lack of representation to children in these cases. Tommy feels his first step
should be to obtain a personal interview with you if you can fit it into your schedule."
10. E.g., Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(7) (Supp. 1967); Florida, FLA.
STAT. § 61.20 (1969); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.390 (Supp. 1974), requiring welfare
department or probation staff investigation when custody is disputed. See generally Con-
nally, Divorce Proctors, 34 BOST. U.L. REV. 1 (1954); Cox, The Divorce Proctor, 33 TENN.
L. REv. 439 (1966).
11. In Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 678, 224 A.2d 870, 872 (1966), the Mary-
land Court of Appeals stated that the agency report should be in writing and made
available to both counsel prior to the Chancellor's decision.
12. See MD. 8TH JUD. CIR. R. [herinafter cited as SUPREME BENCH R.] D75; MD. R.
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final decision may, of course, be made only by the Chancellor."
Although there may be independent appellate review 4 of the
Chancellor's decisions by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
in practice, the Chancellor is generally upheld. 5
The agency reports contain much hearsay and if challenged
for this reason, it would seem that the actual investigator (social
worker) must testify and be subjected to cross-examination."
Even then, the investigator may not testify as to what she 7 was
told by neighbors, friends, teachers and doctors, because that too
would be objectionable as hearsay. Thus, while the personal
observations of the investigator are clearly admissible, 9 ninety
P. D75. The Supreme Bench Rule relates to adoption and requires the judge to order an
investigation before a final determination. The Maryland Rule, also dealing with adop-
tion, provides for the court appointment of an attorney for a parent whose child is to be
adopted if such parent is under a disability (i.e., a minor). Previously, the Maryland Rule
had called for the appointment of a "guardian ad litem" rather than an "attorney."
Curiously, there is no rule dealing with the power or duty of the Domestic Relations Court
to refer custody matter for investigation. Nevertheless, such investigations are routinely
performed in Baltimore City, and there have been numerous cases recognizing the custody
reports submitted by the Adoption and Custody Unit. See, e.g., Jester v. Jester, 246 Md.
162, 228 A.2d 829 (1966); Brendoff v. Titus, 22 Md. App. 412, 323 A.2d 612 (1974).
The Adoption and Custody Unit was reassigned to the Department of Juvenile Serv-
ices in the late 1940's. The Department was reluctant to assume responsibility for this
Unit; however, Thomas P. McCarthy, Administrative Master of the Supreme Bench,
prevailed upon the Department by referring to the predecessor of MD. ANN. CODE art. 52A,
§ 5(b) (1972) which indicated that the Department should provide services requested by
the Juvenile Court "and Judges sitting in other equity Courts, who are dealing with
persons under the age of eighteen years." Since then, the Adoption and Custody Unit has
been a part of the Department of Juvenile Services. The law should be clarified to define
the legal status of this Unit and to spell out its duties, responsibilities and powers. In
addition, such a law should define and regulate the matter of legal admissibility of the
Unit's reports.
13. Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md. App. 361, 311 A.2d 428 (1973) (Chancellor must do more
than merely adopt a Master's Report). If the agency reports do not contain sufficient
information, the Chancellor must, sua sponte, order additional investigation. Snow v.
Watson, 240 Md. 712, 213 A.2d 748 (1965).
14. Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 276 A.2d 698 (1971).
15. E.g., Whetzell v. Wallizer, 241 Md. 711, 713, 216 A.2d 571, 572 (1966); Daubert
v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 310, 211 A.2d 323, 327 (1965).
16. See Annot. 35 A.L.R. 2d (1954).
17. The feminine pronoun is used to refer to the masculine gender as well.
18. Hazell v. State, 12 Md. App. 144, 153, 277 A.2d 639, 644 (1971) (report of
Department of Juvenile Services admissible at juvenile waiver hearings despite its hearsay
character provided there is access to report, opportunity to challenge or impeach the
report, and the right to summon any person to testify); compare In re Carter and Spalding,
20 Md. App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (1974) with In re Ann Jackson, 22 Md. App. 108, 321 A.2d
827 (1974). See note 16 supra.
19. The health, attitudes, preferences and discipline of the children, evaluation of
relevant factors with regard to the parents or those in loco parentis, and the physical
condition of the home and neighborhood are typical personal observations.
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per centum of the substance of such written reports is inadmissi-
ble. The use of the hearsay rule in this context is utterly absurd
if carried to an extreme; and yet, if the struggle is conducted
along traditional adversary lines, the absurdity becomes prac-
tice. 20
In addition to the Department of Juvenile Services, the court
may refer selected problems to the Medical Service of the Su-
preme Bench of Baltimore City21 for investigation, evaluation,
recommendation and report. For example, if the emotional stabil-
ity of one or both of the parents is an issue or if certain delicate
and sensitive matters with regard to a child must be explored, the
court may find need for expert opinion and may refer cases ac-
cordingly. 22 Of course, the report of Medical Service is not admis-
sible per se but is subject to the same hearsay objection as other
agency reports. If there is such an objection, the psychiatrist,
psychologist or psychiatric social worker must testify and be
available for cross-examination. 23
These reports, along with the mental, emotional and intellec-
tual makeup of the Chancellor himself,24 are the tools used to
make these decisions of such crucial importance to our society.
Having presided over both the Criminal and the Domestic Rela-
tions Courts of Baltimore City,25 the author is acutely aware of
the future significance of custody decisions. The personal agonies
20. The attitudes of the various judges who have presided in the Domestic Relations
Court differ. Some have admitted these reports into evidence on the theory that the court
itself has requested such reports which are, therefore, admissible per se. Other judges have
admitted them on the basis that the social worker is an "expert". However, still other
judges have refused to admit the reports if there is an objection.
21. Medical Service is presently headed by the distinguished Jonas R. Rappeport,
M.D., a psychiatrist. The staff includes both full-time and part-time medical doctors,
psychologists, and social workers. Medical students from University Hospital also partici-
pate in the Service. There is a separate juvenile division within the Service.
22. MD. R. P. 420; see also Rappeport, Psychiatrist as an Amicus Curiae (pts. 1 &
2), 18 MED. TRAL TECH. Q. 183, 297 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as Rappeport].
23. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has stated that a psychologist may
testify as to the results of psychological testing administered by him, but he cannot give
an opinion or diagnosis as to sanity or criminal responsibility. Sherrill v. State, 14 Md.
App. 146, 158-59, 286 A.2d 528, 534-35 (1972).
24. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
49-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNrr]. The thesis of this book
is that the psychological rather than the biological relationship is of paramount import-
ance. Joseph Goldstein is a Professor of Law, Science and Social Policy at Yale University
Law School; Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund Freud, is Director of the Hampstead Child
Therapy Clinic and is one of the foremost authorities on the emotional lives of children;
and Dr. Albert Solnit is the Sterling Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry at Yale Univer-
sity School of Medicine and Director of the Yale University Child Study Center.
25. The judges in Baltimore City rotate, pursuant to SUPREME BENCH R. 31, for a
period of one year in the various courts.
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involved in sentencing adult defendants in criminal cases have
naturally led to questions pertaining to the origin of criminal or
deviant behavior.2" Often the answer may be found in the Domes-
tic Relations Court where the unrepresented interests of the child
have been ignored." Society, in the long run, must be concerned
with whether custodial problems have been properly resolved or
merely glossed over by the adversary system to bear bitter crimi-
nal fruit in the future. 28
There is, therefore, growing discussion in the nation,'9 in
26. David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in an address entitled "Juvenile Justice: A Love Hate
Story," focused upon the crisis in juvenile justice. Judge Bazelon stated:
"My own experience with delinquents and criminals is that their lives on the
street have destroyed their ability to empathize with other human beings.
"We must take the first step toward breaking the cycle of poverty which leads
so many of our youths into juvenile courts - a step toward preventing trouble
rather than waiting to cure it.
TRIAL, July/Aug. 1973, at 58.
Judge Dembitz of the New York Family Court has further elaborated upon the rela-
tionship between juvenile delinquency and adult crime by writing that:
While we have no statistics on how many children brought to court as uncontrolla-
ble are therefore proved guilty of juvenile delinquencies or of adult crimes, statistics
do establish the tie between juvenile delinquency and adult crime. Practically all
adults apprehended for robberies, rapes, assaults, and other street crimes that most
alarm the public . ..were juvenile delinquents who generally committed less
serious crimes as juveniles than as adults.
Dembitz, Justice For Children-For Now and for the Future, 60 A.B.A.J. 588, 590 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Dembitz].
27. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit cite Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.
1957), as an example of the consequences of judicial or administrative neglect of the child's
needs. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT , supra note 24, at 34 n.2. In Carter, the consequences
of transferring a child from one foster home to another without recognition of the child's
emotional difficulties was first degree murder. "In any case, multiple placement at these
ages puts many children beyond the reach of educational influence, and becomes the
direct cause of behavior which the schools experience as disrupting and the courts label
as dissocial, delinquent, or even criminal." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT 34. See also S.
GLUECK & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS IN PERSPECTIVE (1968).
28. Peterson, Quay & Cameron, Personality and Background Factors in Juvenile
Delinquency as Inferred from Questionnaire Responses, 23 J. CONS. PSYCH. 395 (1959);
Wirt & Briggs, Personality and Environmental Factors in the Development of
Delinquency, 73 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS No. 15 (1959).
29. Henry H. Foster. Jr., Professor of Law, New York University, a Council member
of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association and co-chairman of the
Research Council, has written "With reference to the policy of safeguarding the interests
of the children of divorce, probably the most practical device is a mandatory requirement
that there be independent counsel to represent the interests of the child." Foster, Current
Thought, A.B.A. NEWS, Aug. 1973, at 5.
Similarly, in their review of GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 24, R. Brant and
J. Brant mentioned that:
The Anglo-American legal system has traditionally given children few legal
rights. . . .In the area of child custody law, where the interests of several adults
[VOL. XXXIV
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Maryland' and in Baltimore City,3' as to whether the present
system can adequately cope with the distressing problems of child
custody. The question is now being asked whether children
should not be represented by a guardian ad litem in custody
actions.2 Many scholars, judges and legal commentators have
voiced great doubt as to the practicability of the present, two-
sided, adversary system in solving problems of this nature.3
While a judge may attempt to use common sense (and not
all judges possess this admirable quality) in custody decisions, he
is not trained in the behavioral or social sciences. A child's real
needs may remain undetected by a judge who, although well
meaning, may disregard what is actually best for a child by
adopting a "common sense" approach.34 Several decades ago,
Roscoe Pound observed that:
The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison
with those of our juvenile courts and courts of domestic
relations. . . . It is well known that too often the placing of
a child in a home or even in an institution is done casually
or perfunctorily, or even arbitrarily. . . . Even with the
and of a child often collide, the law, despite professing to act in the best interests
of the child, has reflected the same 'adultocentric' view that is apparent in other
areas of law as well.
TRIAL, July/Aug. 1974, at 35.
30. The Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice recently recommended the following plan for Maryland:
One division of the Trial Court would be a Family Court that would include domes-
tic relations, juvenile delinquency cases, paternity proceedings, and other family
problems and would operate on a unified basis throughout the State. Specially
trained prosecutors, judges and defenders would handle juvenile cases.
MD. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE COM-
PREHENSIVE PLAN 1974 SUMMARY 32-33.
31. See REPORT OF SPECIAL FAMILY LAW COMM. OF THE BAR ASS'N OF BALTIMORE CITY
(Feb. 6, 1973), where, among the "Areas of Concern", the following question is posited:
"Are the rights of children adequately protected under our present divorce practice,
should there be guardians appointed in all cases where the rights of children are contested
or in the discretion of the court . . .?" Id. at 4.
32. Dembitz, supra note 26, at 588.
33. H. FOSTER, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1974) [hereinafter cited as FOSTER];
S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL (1971); Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce
Actions, 6 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hansen]; Speca & Wehrman,
Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 1
(1969) (a significant work in the development of the guardian ad litem device); Watson,
The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 55 (1969); Note, Alternative to "Parental Right"in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
34. One commentator has stated: "The psychological calculus in child custody de-
terminations compels the question of whether judges are the ablest individuals to factor
these equations. . . . Perhaps custody decisions . . . should not be made by a legally
trained judge alone." Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1311 (1974) (review of
GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT). See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 24, at 67.
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most superior personnel, these tribunals call for legal
checks. 5
Sometimes the Chancellor may talk with the child out of the
presence of attorneys and parents (except that the Court Reporter
must be present"8 ) to gain insight into certain problem areas."
However, a relatively brief, one-time communication between a
judge and a small child is inherently limited in its effectiveness.
Another problem in relying upon the Chancellor to give effect
to the "best interest" test is found in the situation where the
parties have reached their own "agreement" and thus, in effect,
precluded judicial inquiry into the welfare of their children. 8 In
one case, the attorneys told me that the wife would "take" two
of the three children and the husband would "take" the third.
Upon my inquiry as to whether such arrangement was the most
beneficial to the three children,39 the attorneys for the litigants
replied that if the parents had made this decision, then why
should I question it?4" A domestic relations judge with a heavy
caseload may tend to sanction such arrangements blindly without
proper inquiry or, indeed, without any inquiry.41
35. Pound, Foreward to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY
at XV (1952).
36. Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 302 A.2d 682 (1973), outlines the
procedure to be followed with regard to "chambers interviews." See also Nutwell v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 21 Md. App. 100, 108-10, 318 A.2d 563, 568 (1974).
37. The chambers conference may be valuable in determining the attitudes and
preferences of a child. However, while such factors may be considered, they are not
controlling. Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 248 A.2d 890 (1969); Ross v. Pick 199 Md.
341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
38. Professor Foster notes that over ninety per centum of divorce cases are uncon-
tested and frequently involve separation agreements which establish the custody of the
children. FOSTER, supra note 33, at 46. However, in Nutwell v. Department of Social
Servs., 21 Md. App. 100, 318 A.2d 563 (1974), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
reversing an award of guardianship of two children with the right to consent to adoption
to the Department of Social Services over the "vigorous" objections of the natural mother,
noted that the "decree . . . contemporaneously reft the children's common bond with
their brother and sister who were not the subject of the petition." Id. at 101, 318 A.2d at
564; cf. Brendoff v. Titus, 22 Md. App. 412, 323 A.2d 612 (1974).
39. It, generally, is not the policy of the law to separate young children from each
other. The Maryland Court of Appeals has ruled that: "Other things being equal, a
divided control of children is to be avoided." Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123
A.2d 354, 355 (1956); Casey v. Casey, 210 Md. 464, 474, 124 A.2d 254, 258 (1956).
40. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 28 (1973) (agreement by parents concerning child
custody always modifiable by court).
41. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 255 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as RHEINSTEIN]. Max Rheinstein, Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago Law School and Director of the University of Chicago Comparative Law Research
Center, has long been a leader in the field of family law.
Suppose a father had been previously convicted of carnal knowledge of his fourteen
year old daughter, or had been indicted, tried and found not guilty, or had not been
[VOL. XXXIV
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The very real interest of the child may, then, be submerged
in the bitter battle, conducted under the traditional rules of the
adversary system, between his parents. Although the adversary
system is admirably suited to ascertaining truth in a two-sided
controversy where credibility may be the main issue,42 the ques-
tion remains whether this system is the most appropriate for
solving a three-sided problem where one of the three sides in-
volves a fundamentally interested43 and vulnerable" minor child.
A child has physical, material, emotional, moral and educational
needs which the courts must recognize and meaningfully protect.
The guardian ad litem presents the courts with a workable mech-
anism for achieving such a result. Therefore, should not a guard-
ian ad litem be appointed mandatorily by the court to represent
the interests of children in custody, visitation and adoption dis-
putes when issues are raised as to their welfare or where the court
itself has grave concern as to their welfare?
The thesis under consideration is that since the parent (or
criminally accused but the daughter had complained to her mother to no avail. The
parents might agree, through counsel, that the father shall have custody of the daughter.
Should not someone then, at least, have the right of inquiry? See generally 1 L. MARSHALL
& G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT - MARYLAND (1932).
42. See Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 380 n.3, 319 A.2d 841, 843 n.3 (1974).
43. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit refer to the child as an "indispensable party to the
[custody] proceeding." GOLDSTIN, FREUD & SoLNrr supra note 24, at 65. This conclusion
is supported by citation to the statement of Mr. Justice Curtis in Shields v. Barrow, 58
U.S. 130, 139 (1854), on party status:
The court here points out three classes of parties to a bill of equity. They are:
1. Formal parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought
to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it
to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice,
by adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed
necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties before
the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final
justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not
indispensable parties. 3. Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy,
but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 24, at 65 n.l.
44. Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 309, 192 A.2d 775, 777 (1963) (children lack
"mature judgment"); cf. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973).
See 1 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (1840):
The feebleness of infancy demands a continual protection. Everything must be
done for an imperfect being, which as yet does nothing for itself. The complete
development of its physical powers takes many years; that of its intellectual facul-
ties is still slower. At a certain age, it has already strength and passions, without
experience enough to regulate them. Too sensitive to present impulses, too negli-
gent of the future, such a being must be kept under an authority more immediate
than that of the laws . ...
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person in loco parentis) may not necessarily be the one who will
most adequately espouse and protect the best interest of a child,45
the child is then entitled to his own representative to insure that
his legitimate interests will be properly safeguarded. The guard-
ian ad litem would not be responsible to either parent (or current
custodian). This neutrality would better insure that the Chancel-
lor is furnished with reliable and unprejudiced information. Fur-
ther, the guardian could investigate and perhaps find certain
situations in which obvious relief could be afforded to mutually
unaware parents.4" He might also uncover certain detrimental
conditions as regards the child or debilitating home conditions,47
and the guardian could bring such facts to the attention of the
Chancellor for appropriate disposition.
The guardian may be in a better position than the adver-
saries to present the court with the proper criteria for actually
satisfying the best interest test. The parties may, for example, be
so busy hammering upon the adultery or other "fault" of each
other that neither presents the Chancellor with an insight into the
real needs of the child. The parties are invariably so emotionally
charged that the case degenerates into an unproductive battle as
far as the Chancellor is concerned. Even the attorneys may be-
come extremely emotional and lose their professional "cool." It
seems that in the area of domestic relations this is a common
phenomenon. Perhaps this is true because the litigants are prone
to insist that they want a "fighter" for an attorney (or one who
will not "sell out to the other side"), and these pressures inevita-
bly generate more heat than light. As a neutral party, the guard-
ian would not be as vulnerable as the respective attorneys to the
antagonism between the parents. Hopefully then, the guardian
would be in a position to work between the parties to achieve a
note of consonance rather than dissonance. As such, the guardian
could strive to bring about evidentiary stipulations (which could
greatly expedite the trial) or to conduct a pre-trial conference
which might actually bring about a resolution of the custody
problem. It sometimes happens that one spouse will ask for cus-
tody simply because the other spouse seeks a divorce,48 and if such
45. See note 93 infra for a discussion of parental child abuse. Clearly, when such
circumstances exist, the parent will not adequately espouse and protect the best interest
of the child.
46. For example, newcomers to the city from rural areas might be ignorant of the
panoply of available municipal services.
47. The most common problem areas which a guardian ad litem might investigate
relate to health, neglect and school truancy.
48. "Removal of the time-honored, soundly approved right to 'refuse' a divorce to
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a pre-trial conference is skillfully conducted under the impartial
auspices of a guardian ad litem, the custody demand may well
be dropped. Also, through a pre-trial conference, the guardian
might ascertain that the matter of visitation is the real problem
and an equitable suggestion in this often troublesome area may
well resolve the custody problem. It is possible that certain fears
may be allayed by disclosures supplied at such a conference-
fears that cannot be as readily dealt with by attorneys who must
otherwise proceed along adversary lines.
The use of a guardian, as a means to protect the interests of
a minor, is not new to Maryland law. The device of a guardian,
custodian or trustee is routinely utilized to protect minors in
matters involving decedent estates49 and in the regulation of gifts
to minors. 0 This technique is also employed in the settlement of
actions brought on behalf of a child in a court of law,' and a
child's money judgment is protected by the appointment of a
"trustee" when he so recovers.52 If the "best interest of the child"
is said to be paramount 3 and if the child is furnished with, and
protected by, a guardian as concerns his money and property,
then is there not a much more obvious need for a guardian when
a child's future life is concerned? Could it be that when financial
matters are at stake, legal representation is more adequate?54
Developing Juvenile Rights
Let no one minimize the importance of a custody decision.
It determines with whom a child will live; where he will live;55
what kind of clothes he will wear; where he will go to school;56
what religion he will follow;" what type of food he will eat; with
whom he will associate; what books he will read; and what values
an 'erring' spouse may well have merely transferred the rage and need for revenge felt by
the 'wronged spouse' to the remaining areas where threat and blackmail may still be
effective: custody and support." Church, Counselor at Law, A Game of Chess?, TIAL,
Sept/Oct. 1972, at 27.
49. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., §§ 9-109, 13-501, 13-502 (1974).
50. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., §§ 13-301-10 (1974).
51. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 6-405 (1974).
52. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., §§ 13-401-07 (1974).
53. See cases cited note 8, supra and accompanying text.
54. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State,
4 FAMILY L.Q. 320, 341 (1970).
55. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 114-20, 43 A.2d 186, 190-93(1945).
56. Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 248 A.2d 890 (1969); Smith v. Smith, 227 Md.
355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962); see also O'Connor v. O'Connor, 22 Md. App. 519, 323 A.2d 632
(1974).
57. Cf. Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 190 A.2d 621 (1963).
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he will learn. In sum, a custody decision affects the very essence
of what determines a child's future life.58
Is this type of determination to be made only on the basis of
the material produced by two litigating warriors and an agency
report that can be rendered nugatory by a skillful attorney?
Should we not consider the possibility of having the legitimate
interest of a child espoused and protected by his own attorney:
one not controlled by either of the combatants but guided only
by the very real interest of the child. Would this not breathe real
meaning into the phrase "best interest" of the child?
It will undoubtedly be argued that we do not need a guardian
and that there is no need for a change in the law because the "best
interest" test adequately supplies the answers to custody prob-
lems. Such an argument fails to appreciate the difficulty of defin-
ing the "best interest" test. While all agree that the "best inter-
est" or the "best welfare" of a child is the paramount considera-
tion, the legal significance of these phrases has undergone (and
is still undergoing) change of fundamental nature.
An analysis of the evolving rights of the putative father of an
illegitimate child reflects the increased judicial concern with the
"best welfare" of the child. Until recently, it was universally held
that the putative father had no right to notice or to a hearing
when the custody of his child was being determined because he
could not legally affect the custodial welfare of the child. 5 How-
ever, in 1972, the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illinois° that
the putative (and biological) father was constitutionally entitled
to notice and opportunity to be heard when custody of his chil-
dren was being transferred to neighbors (by a state agency) after
the death of the natural unwed mother. The theory upon which
the Supreme Court premised its decision was that the putative
father might be the most qualified person to satisfy the "best
interest" test.6'
58. See generally 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 796 (1966); 27B C.J.S.
Divorce § 308 (1959); NATIONAL COLLEGE OF THE STATE JUDICIARY, FAMILY LAW 77 (1972);
L. BovET, PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1951).
59. E.g. Qureshi v. Department of Social Serv., 11 Md. App. 615, 621, 276 A.2d 675,
678 (1971); see generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5.3 (1968). (Homer
H. Clark, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, is on the editorial
board of Family Law Quarterly [hereinafter cited as CLARK]; see H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITI-
MACY: LAw AND SOCIL POLICY 10-21, 297-306 (1971); Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 45, 84-88 (1959).
60. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
61. The father had lived intermittently with the children and their natural mother
for 18 years. Id. at 645.
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The full impact of Stanley has not yet been determined.2 In
1973, Maryland, apparently, adhering to the mandate of Stanley,
modified its prior law (that a putative father was not entitled to
custody 3) and now relies upon the "best interest" test even if the
father is putative and the children are illegitimate. 4 However,
there still remained the question of whether Stanley required that
notice be given the putative father in an adoption case. 5 Signifi-
cantly, the Maryland Rules of Procedure were recently amended
to read: "If the person to be adopted . . .is a minor, the show
cause order shall be served on the . . . putative father of a child
born out of wedlock in the manner provided by Rule 104 . . . or
Rule 105."66
The Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault" further serves
to illustrate judicial expansion of the "best interest" test. In
holding that due process required that children (juveniles) be
represented by an attorney in juvenile court delinquency proceed-
ings, the Court rejected the traditional doctrine that the child's
interest would be protected by the doctrine of parens patriae.6 9
62. The question has been posed as to whether sex is now a "suspect classification."
If so, a state giving notice and opportunity to be heard to the mother in custody matters
would be required to provide the same for the putative father. Compare Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) with Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1974).
63. Ramsay v. Thompson, 71 Md. 315, 18 A. 191 (1889); Butler v. Perry, 210 Md.
332, 123 A.2d 453 (1956).
64. Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 302 A.2d 682 (1973); See MD. ANN.
CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., §§ 3-602, 6-202(5) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 66A-
66P (1973); cf. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (1974).
65. In re Malmstedt, 243 Md. 92, 220 A.2d 147 (1966) (holding that the putative
father has no specific rights); but see Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Serv., 405 U.S. 1051
(1972); Schafrick, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Paren-
tal Rights, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 75 (1973). See also the cautious approach of Maryland's Attorney
General, 57 Op. ATT'v GEN. 8 (1972). Illinois requires such notice. See Hession, Adoptions
after "Stanley" - Rights for Fathers of Illegitimate Children, 61 ILL. B. J. 350 (1973).
Additionally, the Orphans Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Mifflin County,
Pennsylvania, has dismissed the petition of an unwed mother seeking the voluntary relin-
quishment of her child for failure to give notice to the child's father. Relinquishment of
Baby Boy Z-1, 23 Fiduc. Rep. 574 (Pa. Court of Common Pleas 1973).
66. MD. R.P. D74cl (effective July 1, 1974).
67. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, as interpreted in Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of co-defendant's confession implicating
defendant reversible error where co-defendant does not testify), applies to juvenile delin-
quency adjudicatory hearings. In re Appeal No. 977, 22 Md. App. 511, 323 A.2d 663 (1974).
However, the Supreme Court has held that there is no right to a jury trial in Juvenile
Court. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
69. The doctrine originated in England where the Crown would take the place of the
parents to protect those subjects who were unable to protect themselves. Note, A Case
for Independent Counsel to Represent Children in Custody Proceedings, 7 NEW ENGLAND
L. REV. 351, 352 (1972). Parens Patriae (parent of the country) was a "diluted" form of
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The theory that a benevolent judge representing the state would
furnish the best protection for juveniles was found to be inade-
quate to secure a child's constitutional rights. Implicit in Gault
is the conclusion that the legal rights of a child in a delinquency
hearing are not necessarily safeguarded by a "Big Brother"
Judge. Yet, in a matter of equal or perhaps greater importance
-custody-the interests of the child still remain entrusted to
the care of a judge. While all states, including Maryland, 0 sub-
scribe to parens patriae, the doctrine is not a "blank check""1 to
be used to deny children the protection now mandated by the
United States Supreme Court.
In yet another area, the "best interest" test is undergoing a
critical metamorphosis. With the advent of the Equal Rights
Amendment in Maryland,72 a father may now assert custodial
rights equivalent to those of a mother.73 If it be contended that
he always had such "equal rights,"74 it did seem that the mother's
rights were, in practice, more "equal" than those of the father.75
Withal, it is possible that the welfare of a child may be served
best by awarding custody to the father rather than the mother;"
patria potestas (a quasi-legal-religious part of Roman private law whereby the father was
regarded as high priest of family worship with lifelong authority over all members of his
household). Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MASS. L.Q.
229, 230 (1970). In the United States, a state, as the sovereign, has the power of guardian-
ship over persons under disability such as minors, insane and incompetent persons. Town-
send v. Townsend, 205 Md. 591, 596, 109 A.2d 765, 767 (1954); Ex parte Cromwell, 232
Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963).
70. Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md. App. 361, 366, 311 A.2d 428, 431 (1973); see Thistlewood
v. Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964).
71. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343, 347 (1972)
Ihereinafter cited as Foster & Freed].
72. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 46.
73. The "maternal preference" has also been removed by statute. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1973) (neither spouse shall be given preference in a court custody
proceeding because of sex).
74. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (Supp. 1973), § 66 (1973); art. 27, § 88(b) (Supp.
1973); art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1973); see also 2 U. BALT. L. REV. 355 (1973).
75. E.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960), which states that because
the mother is the natural guardian of the
young and immature, custody is ordinarily awarded to her, at least temporarily in
legal contests between parents when other things are equal, even when the father
is without fault, provided the mother is a fit and proper person to have custody.
Id. at 357, 157 A.2d at 446; accord, Stern v. Homer, 22 Md. App. 421, 324 A.2d 134 (1974);
see aLso CLARK, supra note 59, at 585; Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American
Family Law, 2 J. FAMILY L. 101 (1962). The mother wins four-fifths of all custody cases.
P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 131 (1959).
76. While the function of mothering is crucial in a child's first year of life, it is felt
that a child between the ages of three and six years should have both male and female
parent figures and that if both are not present, "it may be essential to place the child with
his father because he can provide a substitute mother, or with his mother because she can
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and the Amendment will undoubtedly have the effect of generat-
ing more even-handed treatment."
Stanley teaches that labels (illegitimacy) are not sufficient
to furnish the best answers to questions of custody; Gault demon-
strates that the rights of children in juvenile delinquency hearings
must be protected by the expertise and training of lawyers; and
the Equal Rights Amendment mandates that the sex of a person
shall no longer be the exclusive consideration in custody cases.
The instant postulate, therefore, is that in matters of custody, the
need is to provide realistic protection for children, and this pro-
tection will be afforded most effectively by a specialized attorney
whose expertise and loyalty will be devoted purely to his clients,
the children. Acceptance of this postulate can be seen in the
emerging recognition that children are "persons"" under the law
with certain rights-qua children-just as clearly, it is con-
tended," as other groups of persons, i.e., blacks, mentally re-
tarded, 0 women,8" inmates 2 and poor people. 3
Theoretical Basis for the Proposed Solution
The concept of the guardian ad litem, as a device for further-
ing the interests of the child, first emerged in the writings of the
legal commentators. The device is now generally accepted among
provide a substitute father." From the ages of six to twelve, if only one parent can be
provided, the sex of the parent "may matter less than either the kind of home atmosphere
which can be provided, or the child's attitude towards the parent." In normal adolescent
placement situations, the placing of a child with "the parent most capable of wielding
constructive control [is desirable]. Usually, but not invariably, this is the parent of the
same sex." Address of Dr. Herbert C. Modlin, Dir., Div. of Law and Psychiatry, The
Menninger Foundation, presented at the Section on Family Law Meeting, American Bar
Ass'n (1963), printed in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF THE STATE JUDICIARY, FAMILY LAW 81-83
(1972).
77. See Minner v. Minner, 19 Md. App. 154, 310 A.2d 208 (1973); Colburn v. Col-
burn, 20 Md. App. 346, 316 A.2d 283 (1974); see also Gabler, The Impact of the ERA on
Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on California, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 51 (1974).
78. The Supreme Court in Jiminez v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2496
(1974), has ruled that under the Social Security Act, insurance benefits due an illegitimate
child (born after the disability of his father) may not be denied even though the Act
proscribed such a sub-class of illegitimate children. The Court viewed a child as a depen-
dent by virtue of his status as a child with no showing of dependency or paternity neces-
sary to qualify him.
79. FOSTER, supra note 33.
80. Haggerty, Kane & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally
Retarded, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 59 (1972).
81. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1974); see L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND
THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969); K. MILLETr, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970);
Symposium- Women and the Law, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 1 (1970).
82. Wolff v. McDonnell, __ U.S. __, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
83. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the commentators, but has received only limited judicial ap-
proval.
In 1956, Professor Bradway"4 mounted a devastating attack
upon the use of the adversary system in custody proceedings. He
was especially critical of the secondary role assigned to the child
by this system. Professor Bradway reasoned that despite the his-
torical basis for precluding children from litigating against their
parents,85 children should be made parties to divorce proceedings.
He postulated that as a matter of "public relations" children
should have a representative to protect them from the "benefi-
cent" interest of the court.
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., formerly dean of the Boston College
Law School, rather than relying on "public relations," provided
a legal basis for the adoption of the guardian ad litem. He viewed
the rationale for the device as a function of the third party benefi-
ciary theory of contracts. Dean Drinan's thesis was that children
were third party beneficiaries of the marriage contract and, as
such, should be represented in divorce actions. He, therefore,
asserted that the State, by means of a guardian ad litem, should
represent children of divorce."6
Subsequently, Judge Robert W. Hansen of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court 7 set forth, in a "Bill of Rights for Children," 8
84. Bradway, Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 665
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Bradway].
85. But cf. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (children permitted,
under limited circumstances, to sue father's estate).
86. Drinan, The Rights of Children Whose Parents are Divorced, 1962 U. ILL. L. F.
618; cf Spates v. Spates, 267 Md. 72, 77-79, 296 A.2d 581, 584-85 (1972) (dicta) (child a
third party beneficiary of a separation agreement between parents).
87. Judge Hansen formerly presided over the Milwaukee Family Court.
88. Hansen, supra note 33, at 5-6. A printed copy of this Bill (derived from Wiscon-
sin appellate decisions) is given to divorce-seeking parents at the commencement of any
court hearing. The Bill accords to children:
I. The right to be treated as an interested and affected person and not as a pawn,
possession or chattel of either or both parents;
II. The right to grow to maturity in that home environment which will best guar-
antee an opportunity for the child to grow to mature and responsible citizenship;
III. The right to the day by day love, care, discipline and protection of the parent
having custody of the children;
IV. The right to know the non-custodian parent and to have the benefit of such
parent's love and guidance through adequate visitations;
V. The right to a positive and constructive relationship with both parents, with
neither parent to be permitted to degrade or downgrade the other in the mind of
the child;
VI. The right to have moral and ethical values developed by precept and practices
and to have limits set for behavior so that the child early in life may develop self-
discipline and self-control;
VII. The right to the most adequate level of economic support that can be pro-
vided by the best efforts of both parents;
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certain rights to be accorded children affected by divorce actions.
This Bill was subsequently expanded upon by Professors Foster
and Freed in their "Bill of Rights for Children." Professor Foster,
perhaps the leading advocate of the guardian ad litem theory, in
conjunction with Professor Freed, has asserted that a child should
have certain moral and legal rights, including the right:
1. To receive parental love and affection, discipline and
guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment
which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible
adult;
2. To be supported, maintained, and educated to the best
of parental ability, in return for which he has the moral duty
to honor his father and mother;
3. To be regarded as a person, within the family, at school,
and before the law;
4. To receive fair treatment from all in authority;
5. To be heard and listened to;
6. To earn and keep his own earnings;
7. To seek and obtain medical care and treatment and
counseling;
8. To emancipation from the parent-child relationship
when that relationship has broken down and the child has
left home due to abuse, neglect, serious family conflict, or
other sufficient cause, and his best interest would be served
by the termination of parental authority;
9. To be free of legal disabilities or incapacities save where
such are convincingly shown to be necessary and protective
of the actual best interests of the child; and
10. To receive special care, consideration, and protection in
the administration of law or justice so that his best interests
always are a paramount factor.89
From the fifth right, there has developed the "right to have stand-
ing in legal proceedings to assert one's claim of interest";"0 and,
thus, the conceptual right to be represented by a guardian ad
VIII. The right to the same opportunities for education that the child would have
had if the family unit had not been broken;
IX. The right to periodic review of custodial arrangements and child support
orders as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the child may require;
X. The right to recognition that children involved in a divorce are always disad-
vantaged parties and that the law must take affirmative steps to protect their
welfare, including where indicated, a social investigation to determine, and the
appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect their interests.
89. Foster & Freed, supra note 71, at 347.
90. FOSTER, supra note 33, at 42.
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litem. The theory is that children should not be treated as appen-
dages in a divorce case but should be recognized as persons with
rights peculiar to their minority status." Clearly children are
"real parties in interest where their placement is at stake."92 It
will, thus, not suffice to leave matters of custody and visitation
entirely to benevolent parents-or even to the courts-because
in too many instances, parents are not truly benevolent93 and
judges may not have the time or training to produce proper cus-
tody decisions in the mass of divorce cases that now flood the
courts. 4
EMERGING DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVICE OF GUARDIAN Ad Litem
In 1960, Wisconsin modified the adversary system in its law
of domestic relations by slowing up and "softening"95 the divorce
process. A divorce action in Wisconsin may only be commenced
by the filing of a summons which is then served upon the other
spouse. The summons is merely a formal notification and does
not provide any legal or factual details. Thereafter, if a spouse
still wishes to pursue the divorce, he must, after sixty days, file a
complaint setting forth only the statutory ground for divorce.
Again, the complaint may not provide any specific charges. 6
Thus, the Wisconsin procedure "softens" the divorce process by
precluding reference to injurious details which might prompt the
target to respond in kind. 7
91. Foster & Freed, supra note 71, at 347.
92. FOSTER, supra note 33, at 43.
93. Child abuse is a crime in Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973),
and is a growing problem in the United States. The United States Children's Bureau
estimates that there are presently between 50,000 and 75,000 cases annually. It has been
further estimated that 1.5 million annual cases will occur within the next ten years if the
present pattern continues unabated. Pauley, Battered Children: A National Disgrace, The
Daily Record, Aug. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 5. Most child battering is done by apparently
"normal people" who "strike out in rage, resentment or sheer ignorance." IRWIN, To
COMBAT CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (published by Public Affairs Committee). See also
McCord, Battered Child, 50 MINN. L. REV, 1 (1965); Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, Child
Abuse Reporting Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966);
Foster & Freed, The Battered Child, TRIAL, Dec./ Jan. 1966-1967, at 33. And, as pointed
out by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, the "battered child" may, when he becomes a parent,
be a "battering parent." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SOLNIT, supra note 24, at 5, 17, 127. See
generally, Note, The Battered Child: Logic In Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364
(1971).
94. Rheinstein, supra note 41, at 255.
95. Hansen, Wisconsin Family Code-After Five Years, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 68, 69
(1965).
96. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 247.061 (Supp. 1974).
97. I have heard testimony of how a child has discovered a Bill of Complaint filed
against his mother, charging the mother with adultery in damaging language. In most
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A second time period must elapse before trial so that there
may be a statutory "effort to reconcile." This procedure provides
for approximately a four month period between commencement
of the action for divorce and the actual trial. Additionally, the
decree entered upon the conclusion of the trial is interlocutory in
that it does not end the status of husband and wife until one year
after its rendition.9 8
Because it was felt that the marriage contract was of more
significance to society than other contracts, that marriage was the
foundation of the family and, therefore, of society, and that the
stability of the family was basic to morality and civilization, the
State of Wisconsin made a further important and fundamental
change in its domestic relations law. Specifically, a full-time
Family Court Conciliation Department was created to provide
the machinery for mandatory efforts to effect a reconciliation
between the spouses. 9
Marriage counselors (from the Department)00 interview the
parties and attempt to aid in the solution of any existing prob-
lems. However, if there can be no reconciliation, the counselors
are entrusted to so report. Nevertheless, Judge Hansen states
that many marriages have been saved by this required counseling
procedure.' 0
A full-time Family Court Commissioner was also established
(in the larger counties) 02 to make a "full and impartial investiga-
tion of the case" and to "fully advise the court as to the merits
of the case and the rights and interests of the parties and the
public" and "to appear in the action,' ' 0 3 particularly when the
defendant fails to answer. The Commissioner participates in the
trial with the same right as counsel for the parties to interrogate
witnesses, to subpoena additional witnesses, and to argue against
the granting of a divorce.' 4
The concept of protecting the marriage was then judicially
instances, the child transformed his dismay into open hatred for his father. Judge Hansen
feels the avoidance of harsh words serves the purpose of not aggravating the family situa-
tion and is thus, most significant.
98. Hansen, Wisconsin Family Code-After Five Years, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 68, 71
(1965).
99. WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 247.081(1), 247.15(1) (Supp. 1974); see also Hansen, supra
note 33, at 3-4.
100. All counselors hold Master's degrees in Social Work. Hansen, Wisconsin Family
Code-After Five Years, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 68, 73 (1965).
101. Id.
102. A part-time court officer is appointed for each of the smaller counties.




broadened to include the matter of representing children in di-
vorce actions. In Kritzik v. Kritzik,"'5 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court expounded upon the duty of the trial court to safeguard the
welfare of any children affected by divorce proceedings. Recogniz-
ing that children involved in a divorce are disadvantaged parties
and that the law must take affirmative steps to protect their
welfare, the court stated:
In making his determinations as to what conditions of a di-
vorce judgment would best serve the interests of the children
involved, the trial court does not function solely as an arbi-
trator between two private parties. Rather, in his role as a
family court, the trial court represents the interests of society
in promoting the stability and best interests of the family.
It is his task to determine what provisions and terms would
best guarantee an opportunity for the children involved to
grow to mature and responsible citizens, regardless of the
desires of the respective parties.'"6
Among the "affirmative steps" available to a court for ensur-
ing the welfare of children is the power to order a preliminary
investigation of the particular needs of the children. The court's
custody decision would then be deferred until such evaluation
had been made available to both the parties and the court.0 7
The judges of the Milwaukee Family Court also caused to be
printed the "Bill of Rights for Children"'0 8 in which each Right
was based upon the holding of a Wisconsin appellate court. A
copy of the Bill is presented to parties in a divorce action at
preliminary hearings on pendente lite motions.
Finally, in Wendland v. Wendland'° the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recommended the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of children involved in divorce proceed-
ings. The court stated: "[w]here there is a hotly contested cus-
tody dispute, and the court is satisfied that the procedure of
relying on the two parties and the investigation of a welfare
agency may not produce all the important evidence that the court
105. 21 Wis.2d 442, 124 N.W.2d 581 (1963).
106. Id. at 448, 124 N.W.2d at 585.
107. In Baltimore City, the preliminary investigation is done on the basis of custom
by the Adoption and Custody Unit of the Department of Juvenile Services, supra note
12, and in the counties, such work is done by either the Department of Social Services or
probation officers. In Wisconsin, the recommendation of the Family Conciliation Depart-
ment Worker is made from the witness stand and the Worker is qualified as an expert in
the field of child welfare.
108. See note 88, supra.
109. 29 Wis.2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
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should consider in looking after the best interest of the children,
a guardian ad litem should be appointed."' 0 Underlying this
recommendation was the court's opinion that: "children. . .are
not to be buffeted around as mere chattels in a divorce contro-
versy, but rather are to be treated as interested and affected
parties whose welfare should be the prime concern of the court in
its custody determinations.""' Wendland thus ruled that the
court was primarily responsible for protecting the welfare of chil-
dren in divorce proceedings. However, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recommended that the trial court, in furtherance of this
responsibility, appoint a guardian ad litem in matters where cus-
tody is "hotly contested" or where the court has special reason
for concern."'
Other states have, in varying degrees, followed the reform
course of Wisconsin. The legislatures of Connecticut' 3 and Mis-
souri"' have provided their courts with the statutory authority to
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the chil-
dren in matters of custody. The courts of Rhode Island", and
110. Id. at 156, 138 N.W.2d at 191 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. The guardian ad litem 's duties were said not to be inconsistent with those of
the Conciliation Department because the guardian could make further investigation and
call additional witnesses to testify. Id. at 156, 138 N.W.2d at 191.
113. Pub. L. No. 73-373 (Jan. Session, 1973) which will be CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§§ 46-15(N), 46-16. This new divorce reform law provides that if at any time during the
pendency of any action for divorce It appears that the rights of any child of the marriage
are not being adequately protected, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the
interest of the child. Further, after the filing of a complaint for dissolution, either party
or a child of sufficient age and intelligence may request the court to appoint counsel for
the child. The court is required to make such an appointment when a custody agreement
is submitted by the parents. The court may also appoint counsel for a child where custody,
care, education, visitation or child support is in controversy or where the court deems such
representation to be in the best interest of the child. Moreover, before the court allows
third persons to intervene in custody controversies, the law says that the court shall
appoint counsel for the child. Counsel's fee is paid by either or both of the parties or by
the child's estate.
114. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.020 (Supp. 1974). The statute requires the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in an adoption case by providing that the Juvenile Court is without
jurisdiction to proceed in the adoption of a person under the age of twenty-one years until
a guardian ad litem has been appointed for such child. See generally Speca & Wehrman,
Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1
(1969).
115. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has accorded the Family Court Justices
the inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of minor
children and to assist the court in hearings before it. In Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 238
A.2d 373 (1968), the court stated that:
It is well settled that whenever in any judicial proceeding it shall be made to appear
that there are interests of a minor to be protected, the judicial officer presiding has
the inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem for the protection of the minor's
interests.
Id. at 421, 238 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added).
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Ohio" have achieved similar results by relying on the inherent
judicial power to safeguard the interests of minors. Finally, sev-
eral states have, at least, acknowledged the public interest in
custody proceedings by requiring that notification be given the
District Attorney or some other public official when parties seek-
ing divorce have children under a certain age." 7 New York had
statutorily established a system of guardians ad litem (called
"Special Guardians") but subsequently repealed the statute."8
Function, Status and Payment of the Guardian Ad Litem
The function of the guardian ad litem would be to assist the
trial judge in any proceedings which may affect children. Judicial
protection of the welfare of the child requires that judges be pro-
vided with the fullest and most professional insights into these
difficult and delicate problems. Without competent assistance,
judges may be forced to rely on their personal notions of what is
"decent," "moral" or "right"" 9 in determining what satisfies the
"best interest" of the child. Thus, the primary responsibility of
the guardian ad litem would be to accurately present the true
needs of the child and, thereby, establish the "best interest" test
as a suitable formulation for ensuring a child's welfare. "A judge
needs all of the real friends he can find.' '120
116. Relying upon a generic guardian ad litem type statute and inherent judicial
power, the judge in Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967), made the
children of divorcing parents actual parties (defendants) to the action and appointed a
guardian ad litem to appear on their behalf.
117. In Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming, the District Attorney or some other public official is required to be notified when
parties seeking divorce have children under a certain age. Foster & Freed, supra note 71,
at 356 n.42. In Michigan the prosecuting attorney is directed by statute to appear at the
hearing and to introduce evidence opposing the divorce if the interests of the children and
the public good so require. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.45 (1967).
118. In 1967, New York statutorily established Conciliation Bureaus which were
headed by Supreme Court Justices. The Supervisory Justice of each Bureau had the power
to appoint as many Conciliation Commissioners, Special Guardians and Counselors as
deemed necessary: the law stating that if "there are minor ... children of the marriage,
the commissioner may request the supervising justice to appoint a special guardian for
the minor . . . children. Upon such appointment, the special guardian shall be deemed
to be a party to the proceeding." Law of April 26, 1966, ch. 254, § 8, [1966] N.Y. Laws
(repealed 1973). There were few, if any, Special Guardians appointed under this law. As
a result of the New York experience, Professor Foster advocates "mandatory rather than
discretionary authority to appoint independent counsel to represent children." Letter
from Henry H. Foster, Jr. to the author, Oct. 22, 1973.
119. Kramer, The 'Psychological Parent' is the Real Parent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1973, §6 (Magazine), at 70 [hereinafter cited as Kramer].
120. See Rappeport, supra note 22, at 309.
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As part of his function, the guardian would obtain informa-
tion from the usual administrative sources 2' but he would not be
restricted to them. The guardian should have full right of legal
discovery. He should be able to augment the agency reports by
more intensive scrutiny of possible "trouble" areas contained in
such reports.'22 In so doing, he might be led to situations which
the parents might prefer to leave unnoticed. Perhaps a neglect
case might be uncovered in the files of the Department of Social
Services, or the guardian might perceive the need for Medical
Service to enter the picture even if such action is opposed by the
parents. He would report such matters to the judge so that these
issues could be fully considered.
Once the pre-trial or hearing phase of the matter (custody,
visitation or adoption) is concluded, the guardian would also be
called upon to fulfill his responsibility in court. He should be able
to present evidence as to the child's viewpoint and the child's
needs so that the judge can make an intelligent and unhurried
decision. Procedurally, the function of the guardian would de-
pend upon the status accorded to the children in domestic pro-
ceedings. To fully ensure the guardian's right to represent the
children affected by domestic relations litigation, the children
should be made actual parties to any litigation involving custody,
child support, visitation or adoption. The guardian ad litem
should be free to summon witnesses; avail himself of pre-trial
discovery; cross-examine; offer evidence; present oral and written
argument to the court; and even to appeal decisions of the court
if such decisions were felt to be adverse to the best interest of the
children.
It may well be that such guardians ad litem will develop into
a new breed of lawyer: "lawyers trained in psychoanalytic child
development and specializing in child-custody cases.' 2 23 While
some may view this as impractical and costly, such specialization
may be the best method of determining what has been called the
"least detrimental alternative"''2 4 for his child client. The guard-
121. See text accompanying notes 10-23 supra.
122. The guardian could supplement the reports by interviewing school teachers and
social workers in either the Department of Social Services or private agencies (such as
Family and Childrens Bureau, Associated Catholic Charities and Jewish Family and
Childrens Service) if it appears that the child is "known" to these agencies.
123. Kramer, supra note 119, at 80; see also Sadoff, Civil Law and Psychiatry: New
Dimensions, 56 A.B.A.J. 165 (1970). This breed of lawyers is not to be confused with the
"matrimonial lawyer." See DuCantu, The Age of Aquarius and the Matrimonial Lawyer,
TRIAL, Sept./Oct. 1972 at 21.
124. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 24, at 53-64.
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ian would also exercise all of the legal rights now afforded chil-
dren as enunciated in Gault.'25 After all, if children involved in
delinquency proceedings are accorded the right to adequate
notice, right of confrontation, right to cross examine, and privi-
lege against self-incrimination," 6 then logic should certainly dic-
tate the same rights in custody (and adoption) matters. In fact,
as Professor Foster points out,' the need for these rights may be
greater in placement matters because in cases where juveniles are
adjudicated delinquent, only about twenty per centum are insti-
tutionalized; ' whereas a placement decision involves the whole
future life of a child.
As to payment, there are a number of approaches. Under the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,'29 the trial judge, except in
cases of indigency, may order one or both of the parties to pay
the guardian ad litem. Or, perhaps, Legal Aid (now the Legal
Services Corporation) would undertake such representation.
These attorneys (and interns from law schools' 0) could furnish
dedicated and competent advocacy. Possibly, the State, through
the Department of Juvenile Services or the Office of the Public
Defender, should provide for and pay such an attorney. Also,
there might be funding through the Law Enforcement and Assis-
tance Administration as a result of the recent enactment of the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 which
is designed to supplement juvenile delinquency prevention and
control efforts at the state and federal level. The matter of such
representation is also one to which the organized Bar must ad-
dress itself, and it is felt that there must be an adequate response
pro bono publico.
Source of Authority
There is considerable authority to the effect that the device
of a guardian ad litem may be judicially established. The argu-
ment is that either equity courts have the inherent power to ap-
125. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
126. Popkin, Lippert and Keiter, Another Look at the Role of Due Process in Juve-
nile Court, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 233 (1972); see in re Appeal No. 977, 22 Md. App. 511, 323 A.2d
663 (1974). However, it should be noted that there is no double jeopardy when the State
appeals from a Master's dismissal of a delinquency petition, and the Juvenile Court
conducts a trial de novo. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 92-106, 321 A.2d 516, 520-27 (1974).
127. Foster, supra note 33, at 44.
128. Id. at 44-45.
129. The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1970.
130. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972).
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point a guardian 3' or the rule-making power of an appellate court
is broad enough to permit the promulgation of rules authorizing
guardians.'32 However, statutory authority is preferred. Logically,
the device should be instituted in the context of a Family Court.'33
The legislature should require mandatory appointment of a
guardian ad litem in divorce proceedings affecting children. Pro-
fessor Foster asserts that when "marriage breakdown" is made a
ground for divorce, counsel for the children should be appointed
mandatorily.'34 Maryland presently requires even less than "mar-
riage breakdown" for a divorce,'35 and, consequently, caution
would dictate the security of a statute. While the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act provides that the court may appoint an
attorney to represent the interests of a minor child with respect
to his support, custody and visitation, '3 the Family Law Section
of the American Bar Association favors making provisions of such
counsel mandatory.' 37 It substitutes "shall" for "may" because
experience has shown that courts rarely if ever appoint such coun-
sel unless the provision is mandatory.'
3
In this context, the provisions of Maryland's new Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article should be noted. Section 2-102, enti-
tled "Special Officers," provides:
If advisable in a specific proceeding, a court may appoint an
auditor, surveyor, court reporter, assistant counsel for the
state, counsel for a party if authorized by law or rule, accoun-
tant, master, examiner, or other officer, and may require his
presence in court.'3 9
However, since children are not actual parties to Maryland di-
vorce and custody proceedings and since the new Article makes
only "stylistic" revisions of the prior codification,'40 it would seem
131. Jenkins v. Whyte, 62 Md. 427, 433 (1884); cf. Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344
(1883); compare Tatem v. Wright, 139 Md. 20, 28-29, 114 A.836, 839 (1921) and Ashton
v. Ashton, 35 Md. 496 (1872). See Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wisc.2d 145, 138 N.W.2d
185 (1965); Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967); Zinni v. Zinni, 103
R.I. 417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968).
132. Cf. MD. R. P. 205d, 205e.
133. See text accompanying notes 199-235 infra.
134. Letter from Henry H. Foster, Jr. to the author, Oct. 2, 1973.
135. See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra.
136. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 310.
137. Letter from Henry H. Foster, Jr. to the author, Oct. 2, 1973.
138. See generally 5 HARV. J. LEGis. 563 (1968) (providing a Model Divorce Act
which favors mandatory appointment).
139. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 2-102 (1974) (emphasis added).
140. See In re Trader, 20 Md. App. 1, 3 n.1, 315 A.2d 528, 530 n.1, rev'd on other
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that the quoted statute does not provide any authority for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.
USE OF THE GUARDIAN Ad Litem WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
CONCILIATION AND COUNSELING
It is submitted that the guardian ad litem device must be
thought of as but one facet of a more fundamental approach to
the entire realm of domestic relations and family problems. In
some respects Maryland already utilizes certain sensible proce-
dures; in others the laws are in an embryonic stage; and in still
others new ground must be broken. As already indicated, one of
the more serious defects in the Maryland divorce procedure is the
lack of any effective means of preserving the rights of an inher-
ently interested child. The use of a guardian ad litem is one
method of safeguarding the child, but the guardian's role is some-
what limited. He does not become involved in domestic problems
until after the parents have determined to seek judicial dissolu-
tion of their marriage. The guardian is, therefore, only able to
champion the interests of the child in those instances in which
the marriage may be dissolved. While we obviously need the serv-
ices presently provided by the Adoption and Custody Unit (of the
Department of Juvenile Services) in matters previously dis-
cussed,"' a guardian ad litem "may well be in a position to con-
duct a further investigation and present evidence to the court
that will help it reach its custody determination."'' Nevertheless
such recommendation is made in the context of litigation, and the
guardian is not otherwise involved in preserving the family. May
we not, then, consider conciliation and counseling as additional
devices for the preservation of the family? Before exploring the
merits of such a proposal, it is necessary to briefly examine the
effect of the present Maryland divorce law upon the family unit.
The State of Maryland now permits absolute divorce, regard-
less of fault, upon the mere passage of a three year time span. 43
While this statutory approach is sensible in some respects, it also
contains a basic flaw which tends to subvert the maintenance of
the family unit. Let us first note, however, the advantages of this
new law. It is salutary to abolish "fault" in divorce situations
grounds, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974); see generally, Adkins, Code Revision in Mary-
land: The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 34 MD. L. REv. 7 (1974).
141. See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
142. HANSEN, supra note 33, at 9.
143. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973); Renner v. Renner, 16 Md. App. 143,
294 A.2d 671 (1972); Jackson v. Jackson, 14 Md. App. 263, 286 A.2d 778 (1972).
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because the traditional fault concept has the effect of producing
hypocrisy in, at least, two instances. First, a marriage may reach
a point of total deterioration without either party being "at fault"
in the conventional legal sense.' Yet, if the parties live under the
same roof, albeit in separate bedrooms with no sexual relations,
they still may not obtain a divorce. 4' The result is that if the
parties really want a divorce, they must manufacture a way to
obtain one. The simplest "way" is for one party to present uncon-
tested testimony as to the abandonment or adultery of the other
spouse (with the other party being present only through his or her
attorney). Both parties are fully aware that such testimony may
be rank perjury. "
Professor Rheinstein labels this type of falsely obtained di-
vorce a "consent divorce."'4 7 He takes the position that this con-
cept developed as a result of a compromise between "conserva-
tives" and "liberals." The conservatives insist that fault or culpa-
bility laws must remain on the statute books even though such
laws are not obeyed. The liberals, although disapproving of the
concept of fault in divorce proceedings, will tolerate these laws as
long as the harsh effects can be avoided by the consent or "migra-
tory" 48 divorce. Professor Rheinstein feels that a tacit truce
evolved until the "crucial breakthrough" of the "no fault" divorce
concept. The breakthrough has taken many forms. As will be
later seen 9 it has taken a sharp and perhaps unusual form in
Maryland.
Perjured testimony also occurs because a "fault" divorce has
144. The conventional "fault" grounds for divorce include adultery, desertion, aban-
donment, cruelty and conviction of a felony. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24, 25 (Supp.
1973).
145. Lillis v. Lillis, 235 Md. 490, 494-96, 201 A.2d 794, 796-97 (1964); cf. Lukat v.
Lukat, 21 Md. App. 354, 319 A.2d 818 (1974).
146. For example, when one spouse has abandoned the other, the abandoned spouse
may obdurately refuse to bring suit for an absolute divorce until he (or she) receives a
property settlement to his (or her) liking. Once such an agreement is reached, there is no
further obstacle, and a quick divorce is usually desired. If the parties begin the twelve
month statutory time period from the date of mutual agreement, no legal or ethical
problem is presented. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1973). However, since a quick
divorce is desired, the parties almost inevitably date the "voluntary" separation from the
date of actual separation even though the initial separation was not "voluntary." Thus,
in order to obtain the desired divorce, the parties resort to perjury in testifying as to the
date of the mutual agreement to separate.
147. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 247.
148. A migratory divorce is one where the "divorce seeker living in a place in which
divorce cannot be obtained at all, or only under difficulty, resorts to the court of another
place in which a divorce can be obtained more easily or, perhaps, just more discreetly."
Id. at 63.
149. See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra.
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been historically considered a punishment for the party guilty of
matrimonial misconduct and a privilege for the spouse innocent
of "wrongdoing." Yet, in those instances when the question of
fault was not well-defined, the concept produced results that were
perceived to be unfair. Efforts to ameliorate the harsh application
of the fault rule led to the establishment of a system of defenses
available to the "wrongdoer." The thought was that if such a
defense prevailed, the "wrongdoer" was felt not to deserve the
"punishment" of a divorce. Thus, if the innocent party con-
doned'" the other's misconduct or if one connived 1 ' at the other
spouse's adultery or if there was collusion 2 or recrimination, 5 '
there could be no divorce. To avoid this system of defenses and
obtain a fault divorce, the parties resorted to perjury.
Even in those cases where there existed a clear situation of
fault with no valid defense, the parties might still find a way to
attenuate'54 or disregard'55 the rigors of the fault predicament) 6
Given these deficiencies in the system of fault, the public grew
cynical, and the need for what Professor Bradway called "better
public relations" grew apace with such cynicism.'57 The disres-
pect thus bred for the law of divorce was a symptom of a deeper
malaise-the concept of culpability itself. From this disenchant-
ment with the concept of culpability developed the idea that
divorces should be granted when there is a breakdown of the
marriage itself; or, as California has legislatively put it, when
there are "irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irre-
mediable breakdown of the marriage."'5 " To the extent that di-
vorce is to be allowed regardless of fault, there is provided a
procedure that will do much to obviate the charades and the
perjury. This new legislation, therefore, provides a welcome relief
from some of the more flagrant abuses of the "consent divorce."'5 "
150. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 245 Md. 703, 227 A.2d 617 (1967), Sullivan v. Sullivan, 223
Md. 74, 162 A.2d 453 (1960).
151. Fonger v. Fonger, 160 Md. 610, 154 A. 443 (1931).
152. Harne v. Harne, 141 Md. 123, 118 A. 122 (1922); Fisher v. Fisher, 95 Md. 314,
52 A. 898 (1902).
153. Matakieff v. Matakieff, 246 Md. 23, 226 A.2d 887 (1967); Courson v. Courson,
208 Md. 171, 117 A.2d 850 (1955). But see Zell v. Zell, 12 Md. App. 563, 280 A.2d 22 (1971).
154. See H. MYERBERG, THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DIVORCE PRACTICE (1961).
155. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 59.
156. C. FooTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 631-769
(1969); M. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT (1956); Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce
and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 1121 (1936).
157. Bradway, supra note 84, at 666-80.
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1969). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-
5138 (West 1969) (Family Law Act of 1969).
159. The removal of fault from divorce may be part of a general trend away from
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The no-fault approach also sensibly resolves another irritant
in the law of divorce which arises from the concept of fault: the
situation where the spouse at fault is held in a perpetual state of
marriage by the other, who, acting out of spite and malice, refuses
to ever seek or permit a divorce. It sometimes happens that one
spouse, badgered beyond description by the other, leaves the
marital abode under circumstances which may not constitute
constructive desertion""0 and then stays away permanently. The
conduct of the party who has been abandoned may be the actual
cause of the separation; and, yet, instead of seeking a divorce,
such party may bring an action only for permanent alimony. '
This will then leave the abandoning spouse in a situation where
he or she can never obtain a divorce' because of legal fault.
There are many more examples of the defects inherent in the
fault system but, apart from hypocrisy, the most telling criticism
is that legal fault may not be the actual cause of marital failure., 3
Thus, if the law requires fault to be proved in an adversary con-
text, it may well intensify conflict between the parties and exac-
erbate the situation with respect to their children."4 The persist-
ent adherence to the concept of fault in the framework of the
adversary system without reference to softening devices such as
counseling and conciliation hastens the break-up of the family
unit. Such a result may operate to the detriment of any children:
"The child's psychopathology is often intensified by the parents'
legal wrangles with resulting depression, withdrawal, phobic fears
or acting out behavior."' 65
Apparently, the Maryland General Assembly has come to the
the concept of fault. See O'Connell, It's Time for No Fault for All Kinds of Injuries, 60
A.B.A.J. 1070 (1974). Workmen's compensation is another area in which the concept of
fault has been legislatively abolished. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, preamble (1964); Colgan
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Md. App. 331, 320 A.2d 82 (1974).
160. The Maryland Court of Appeals has defined constructive desertion as "any
conduct of a [spouse] that renders the marital relationship intolerable and compels the
[other spouse] to leave .. " Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 290, 89 A.2d 609, 612-
13 (1952); accord, Richardson v. Richardson, 17 Md. App. 665, 304 A.2d 1 (1973); Bryant
v. Bryant, 16 Md. App. 186, 294 A.2d 467 (1972); Deckman v. Deckman, 15 Md. App. 553,
292 A.2d 112 (1972).
161. See Moran v. Moran, 219 Md. 399, 149 A.2d 399 (1959) (husband guilty of
desertion despite wife's nagging and jealousy, and wife, therefore, entitled to permanent
alimony); Binder v. Binder, 16 Md. App. 404, 297 A.2d 293 (1972) (wife's excessive use of
alcohol did not justify husband's desertion, and wife, therefore, entitled to permanent
alimony).
162. See note 161 supra.
163. Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 82
(1966).
164. Phillips, Mental Hygiene, Divorce and the Law, 3 J. FAMILY L. 63 (1963).
165. Id. at 67.
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realization that divorce ought to be allowed without regard to
fault or culpability. However, the General Assembly did a rather
anomalous thing by engrafting a no-fault ground onto the existing
grounds for absolute divorce-grounds which include all of the
traditional guilt (or culpatory) grounds.'66 The typical statutory
solution has been to remove culpability as a ground for divorce
and to replace it with the theory of "irremediable breakdown."'' 7
An "irremediable breakdown" statute is based on "irreconcilable
differences" and requires a conflict which must be judicially de-
termined to constitute "substantial reasons for not continuing the
marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should be
dissolved."'" 8 However, Maryland presently has either the best or
the worst of both worlds-a mixture of "fault" and "no-fault"
divorce. Under this hybrid system, one may procure a divorce by
judicially establishing either fault or a three year separation. The
problem with Maryland's approach is that there is no need for
any judicial finding that the marriage should be dissolved. While
words such as "irremediable" and "irreconcilable" may mean
different things to different trial judges, Maryland seems to have
solved the problem by not using any standard in its new no-fault
approach other than a mere passage of time.
Although it would seem that there is an obvious inconsis-
tency between an admixture of culpatory and non-culpatory di-
vorce, there is an opposite view which contends that a party
should be allowed to choose the ground that suits him best.'69 For
example, if one spouse flagrantly commits adultery, it may be
argued that the other should be able to obtain an "adultery"
divorce without allowing for the three years required by the no-
fault statute. But here again, divorce is used as a punishing
weapon without any attempt to ascertain the reason for the adul-
terous conduct. To permit such a divorce too quickly might dis-
solve a long and productive marriage (with children) that might
otherwise be saved by counseling and conciliation techniques.
Does not society have a legitimate right to demand that before
absolute divorce is allowed, there must be a determination that
the marriage is actually untenable and should be dissolved? 7" I
submit that Maryland should remove all grounds for divorce ex-
166. See note 144 supra.
167. Goddard, A Report on California's New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems,
6 FAMILY L.Q. 405, 408 (1972).
168. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4507 (West 1969).
169. Paulsen, Divorce Canterbury Style, 1 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 93 (1966).
170. Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 7
FAMILY L.Q. 169 (1973).
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cept one, namely, that of separation after a certain period; but I
also submit that Maryland should create and implement a sys-
tem for voluntary conciliation and counseling.
Admittedly, some distinguished scholars have voiced a dif-
ferent theoretical viewpoint. Professor Rheinstein, for example,
feels that the evil is not divorce but what he calls "factual mar-
riage breakdown"'"' and, therefore, the parties should have unfet-
tered "freedom to remarry" (Rheinstein's euphemism for di-
vorce). In other words, if we are interested in family stability, we
should look at the causes of actual marital breakdown rather
than simply equate marriage breakdown with divorce. It is hard
to dispute the logic of his position. On the other hand, Rheinstein
concedes that the "therapeutic" approach of conciliation and the
use of a Family Court may have proved to be effective in one
instance. This concession is tempered by his statement that he
"did not know" if such success was due to the plan or to the
unique effectiveness of the presiding officer, Judge Paul Alexan-
der.'72 Further, Rheinstein is criticized by Professor Bodenheimer
who states that Rheinstein seems to feel that divorce is a blessing.
Perhaps it is a blessing to the divorcing spouses but it may not
be to the children. While divorce may be a solution to marital
miseries, 3 there may be other, more satisfactory, solutions to the
problems encountered by those swept into the domestic vortex.
Professor Rheinstein's "freedom" may turn into a curse' 74-what
Kierkegaard called the "despair of possibility."'75
If the cornerstone of our society is felt to be the family unit,'
171. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41 at 266.
172. Id. at 261-62. Judge Alexander prtsides over the Court of Domestic Relations
of Lucas County, Ohio. He has written several articles supporting the concept of a family
court, including: Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the
Problem, 36 A.B.A.J. 105 (1950); Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The
Family Court, 21 Mo. L. REv. 105 (1956); Alexander, The Family Court-An Obstacle
Race? 19 U. Prrr. L. REV. 602 (1958).
173. Bodenheimer, Book Review, 7 FAMLY L.Q. 112 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Bodenheimer].
174. Maddocks, The Alternatives to Marriage Produce Their Own Despair, Balti-
more Sun, Sept. 29, 1974, § K, at 5, col. 1; see J. EPSTEIN, DIVORCED IN AMERICA (1974).
175. S. KIERKEGAARD, The Sickness Unto Death, in FEAR AND TREMBLING & THE
SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 168-70 (1968 ed. W. Lowrie transl.). Although written in a different
context, the following words of Kierkegaard aptly describe the freedom of divorce: "At
last it is as if everything were possible-but this is precisely when the abyss has swallowed
up the self." Id. at 169.
176. Because more families are breaking up than ever before, the family may
seem more dispensable than it was in the past. The contrary is probably true. Until
another institution can provide a role for children-and none, including the kib-
butz, is in sight-the family continues to be indispensable. Although other institu-
tions, such as the schools, may augment the family, none can effectively replace
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then society has a profound stake in actively seeking to preserve
the married family entity. While the extended family may no
longer predominate, the family nucleus still remains, and it
should not be split without every effort being made to preserve
the unit.'77 As Karl Llewellyn stated, the "pair-marriage" is the
best type of (sexual) relationship to provide a foundation for so-
ciety.' If the home is thus recognized as the basic unit in our
civilization, can we not say that anything that destroys this unit
is contrary to public policy? Should we not therefore consider the
therapeutic approach of conciliation and counseling both as to
parents and their children?'79
Undoubtedly certain marriages can be saved by expert coun-
seling services.""0 To sanction automatic divorce after three years
is to permit irreparable harm to the parties and, perhaps, more
importantly, to their children by dissolving marriages and fami-
lies which might possibly be saved.' Those who view the mar-
riage contract as merely another part of the law of contracts
would do well to note the words of Justice Traynor:
The deceptive analogy to contract law ignores the basic fact
that marriage is a great deal more than a contract. It can be
terminated only with the consent of the state. In a divorce
proceeding the court must consider not merely the rights and
wrongs of the parties as in contract litigation, but the public
interest in the institution of marriage. The family is the basic
unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that
ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological drives
its function. Because divorce is common, many children in our society have no
intact family to help them toward a successful role. These children, with less family
involvement, often have a difficult task gaining a successful identity. Many fail,
and hostile about their failure, place a heavy burden on society.
W. GLASSER, THE IDENTITY SOCIETY 133 (1972).
177. H. BECKER & R. HILL, FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD ch. 5, at 131 (2d ed.
1955); J. KUHN, AMERICAN FAMILIES TODAY: DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFERENTIATION OF FAMILIES
); J. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE, A STUDY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION 247 (1931).
178. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1932).
179. See, Note, Counseling the Counselors: Legal Implications of Counseling Minors
Without Parental Consent, 31 MD. L. REV. 332 (1971).
180. California, Arizona and a few other jurisdictions report a high percentage of
reconciliation. Results appear to be much better where there are separate family courts,
rather than where divorce is the most distasteful part of the routine of a court of general
jurisdiction. O'Flarity, Divorce Modern Style, TRIAL, Sept./Oct. 1972, at 16. On the other
hand, many matrimonial lawyers report that conciliation bureaus are of little help. Per-
haps successful efforts at conciliation depend upon a more receptive judiciary and compe-
tent counseling. Id., see also HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE COUNSELING (B. Ard & C. Ard eds.
1969); Henderson, Marriage Counseling in a Court of Conciliation, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 6 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Henderson].
181. Obviously, those marriages without children may also benefit from counseling.
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that might otherwise become socially destructive; it insures
the care and education in a stable environment; it estab-
lishes continuity from one generation to another; it nurtures
and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a
free people. Since the family is the core of our society, the
law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. But when a mar-
riage has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, the
purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will
be permitted. '[Plublic policy does not discourage divorce
where the relations between husband and wife are such that
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly de-
stroyed.'""2
The techniques of conciliation and counseling are being in-
creasingly utilized in the United States,' s3 both in judicial" 4 and
private 5' settings. While phrases such as "marriage counseling"
and "conciliation" are relatively new, the ideas they embody are
ancient. Marriage counseling means:
Those activities which are aimed at helping parties to trou-
bled marriages to understand their difficulties and the
sources of them, and thus to deal with them in a rational
way. Where marital difficulties have source in neurotic
traits, the marriage counsellor may have to resort to therapy,
ordinarily by advising the client to seek the service of a psy-
chotherapist. 8
Conciliation is different. It is the process of attempting to induce
separated parties of a troubled marriage to resume living together
in an untroubled way.
While there are ardent advocates of mandatory conciliation
182. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
183. Conciliation and counseling techniques are already in widespread use in other
countries. See RHEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 437 (France); 301, 438 (Federal Republic of
Germany, certain areas of permissiveness), 190 (Italy), 439 (certain cantons of Switzer-
land), 140, 147 (Sweden), 110 (Japan).
The use of conciliation services is statutorily encouraged in England. The solicitor for
a divorce petitioner must state whether he has informed his client of the desirability of
conciliation and indicated to the client where and how such service is available. Matri-
monial Causes Act 1965, c. 72, § 3(1). In Canada, the lawyer must discuss the possibility
of reconciliation with the client and direct him to marriage counseling facilities for assis-
tance. The Divorce Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. D-8 et seq. (1970); see Bodenheimer, The New
Canadian Divorce Law, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 213 (1968).
184. CLARK, supra note 59, § 11.1, at 284; FOSTER, supra note 33, at 3-7; Henderson,
supra note 180, at 6.
185. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 440; Blackburn, When Your Client Needs Family
Service Counselling, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 71 (1970).
186. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 429; see also N. TALLEY-MORRIS, FAMILY LAW
PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE HANDBOOK 116 (1973).
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and counseling,' 7 the more persuasive reasoning supports the vol-
untary use of these devices. As Professor Clark notes, the question
of reconciliation is ultimately a matter to be decided by the par-
ties themselves and not by state officials, "no matter how well
intentioned.' '8 8 Further, mandatory procedures, requiring one to
submit to involuntary psychotherapy in order to obtain a divorce,
may be an impermissible exercise of state power.'89 The state
should not be allowed to establish conciliation and counseling as
prerequisites for a divorce. However, many persons may not even
know about psychotherapy, or they may have a distorted view
about modern psychiatric techniques. Certainly, there should be
a requirement that the availability of such help be made known
to persons who wend their unhappy ways through the state mo-
nopoly of a divorce court.'90 Should we not require parties seeking
divorce to at least submit to a screening process for the purpose
of educating and informing them as to the possible benefits of
counseling and conciliation? This screening process should be
conducted by persons professionally trained in the social and be-
havioral sciences. Such a professional staff, which is felt to be a
necessity, should not become a dumping ground for incompetents
and misfits.' 9 '
As Dean Pound observed in his discussion of the use of con-
ciliation and counseling in the context of a Family Court, there
is always criticism.'92 One possible argument against adopting the
techniques of conciliation and counseling is that government
(executive and legislative) will neither adequately fund the pro-
fessional staff nor provide for "job recruiting, and opportunities
for research and professional advancement offered by competing
private agencies."' 93 There may be additional criticism that even
assuming such a professional staff, there is insufficient knowledge
about human psychology to effect a cure of the marriage break-
187. Burke, Conciliation-A New Approach to the Divorce Problem, 30 CALIF. ST.
B.J. 199 (1955); Burke, The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases, 1 J. FAMILY L. 209
(1961).
188. CLARK, supra note 59, § 11.1, at 285.
189. See Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VAND. L. REV. 633, 639 (1956).
190. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
191. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967).
192. Pound, The Place of the Family Court in the Judicial System, 5 NATIONAL
PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 161, 162 (1959).
193. Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1205, 1209
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Kay]. Professor Herma Hill Kay offers valuable and penetrat-
ing insights into the entire area of family law.
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down.' The difficulty with such criticism is that, if considered
seriously, we would have to wait until some indeterminable time
in the future to ascertain the magic moment when such truth
becomes evident; and in the interim, we must sit idly by while
marriage breakdown and divorce increase almost geometrically.
Finally, the fact remains that if one seeks priorities in the
allocation of tax dollars and human resources, the top priority
should be our children with all other considerations yielding ac-
cordingly. If it is possible to preserve marriages by virtue of a
professional staff trained in conciliation and counseling and,
thus, to achieve the stability so desperately needed by children, 1915
then a way must be found to have and to use these techniques
appropriately and effectively. Of course, if a marriage is totally
beyond repair, then certainly let it be dissolved. However, should
not society have the right to ascertain that a marriage has irre-
trievably broken down before rubber-stamping a divorce decree,
especially one involving an award of custody?"6 At least, the par-
ties might be made to understand the existence of their psychol-
ogical problems and have pointed out the nature and location of
help which could reduce marital tensions.'97 If, on the other hand,
the professional counseling and conciliation staff ascertains that
the marriage is "over," it would so certify, and society could then
have the security of knowing that everything possible had been
done before permitting dissolution.
FAMILY COURT
Perhaps, the time has come to consider the desirability of
establishing a Family Court in Baltimore City and each of the
metropolitan counties.' Presently, in Baltimore City there are
three separate courts which handle family related problems. This
diffusion of authority causes domestic questions to be considered
in a vacuum and tends to minimize the totality of the family. The
establishment of a Family Court would accentuate the family
194. Id.
195. See THE ANTISOCIAL CHILD: His FAMILY AND COMMUNITY (S. Szurek & I. Berlin
ed. 1969).
196. In the 1970 and 1972 Sessions of the Maryland General Assembly, Senator John
J. Bishop, Jr. introduced legislation seeking to create "Courts of Conciliation," which
failed of passage. It is understood that he plans to introduce similar legislation in later
sessions.
197. See Bodenheimer, supra note 73.
198. In 1973, the Board of Governors of the Maryland State Bar Association author-
ized its Family and Juvenile Council to conduct a study of the advisability of a Family
Court in Maryland. No report has yet been issued.
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structure by placing all of the separate but related courts and
services under one umbrella. Such a unified court would afford a
more complete procedure for treating the interrelated and com-
plex problems associated with the family unit.
A brief examination of the existing "family" system in Balti-
more City exposes the closely associated functions of the separate
courts. There are three courts in the Eighth Judicial Circuit (the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City) that deal with family related
problems: Circuit Court Number Two, Criminal Court Part
Eight, and the Division for Juvenile Causes of the Circuit Court
(Juvenile Court). Pursuant to local court rule, the judges of the
Supreme Bench, except for the judge assigned to the Juvenile
Division, 9' are assigned to the various courts by a system of an-
nual rotation. 2"" The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court Number
Two (the Domestic Relations Court) extends to matters of di-
vorce,20 ' annulment,202 alimony,2 3 child custody,204 visitation, 205
child support,20 6 guardianship, 27 adoption, °20 contempt,200 counsel
fees; 210 and related matters incidental to the foregoing. For exam-
ple, modification proceedings, such as modification of alimony
and child support by way of increase or decrease2 1' and modifica-
tion of custody212 and visitation,2 13 would come within the jurisdic-
199. Recent events suggest the rotational system may be extended to this division.
200. SUPREME BENCH R. 31.
201. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-603(a) (1974).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-602(a)(1974). Winter v. Crowley,
231 Md. 323, 190 A.2d 87 (1963); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); Mullinix
v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 278 A.2d 674 (1971).
205. Radford v. Matczuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960); Colburn v. Colburn,
20 Md. App. 346, 316 A.2d 283 (1974); Barsallo v. Barsallo, 18 Md. App. 560, 308 A.2d
457 (1973).
206. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-602(a)(1974).
207. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 20 (Supp. 1973); Department of Social Serv.
v. Goodyear, 263 Md. 611, 284 A.2d 426 (1971).
208. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-601 (1974).
209. Speckler v. Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 261 A.2d 466 (1970); McDaniel v. McDaniel,
256 Md. 684, 262 A.2d 52 (1970); Gatuso v. Gatuso, 16 Md. App. 632, 299 A.2d 113 (1973);
see MD. R.P. 685C; see also MD. CONST. art. Im, § 38.
210. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 5, 5A (1973); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 17 Md. App.
90, 299 A.2d 520, aff'd 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973); Carney v. Carney, 16 Md. App.
243, 295 A.2d 792 (1972); Bracone v. Bracone, 16 Md. App. 288, 295 A.2d 798 (1972).
211. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 2,3 (1973); Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475, 164
A.2d 877 (1960); Lott v. Lott, 17 Md. App. 440, 302 A.2d 666 (1973).
212. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-602(a)(3) (1974); Wooddy v.
Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467 (1970) (modification of child support payments);
Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965) (modification of custody award).
213. Radford v. Matczuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960); Colburn v. Colburn,
20 Md. App. 346, 316 A.2d 283 (1974).
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tion of the Domestic Relations Court. The judge who presides in
the Criminal Court Number Eight has jurisdiction over "civil
paternity" cases,"' criminal non-support cases" 5 and matters of
"defective delinquency.""21 The Division for Juvenile Causes has
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of children" 7 who are
alleged to be delinquent, dependent, neglected, in need of super-
vision" 8 or mentally handicapped,"9 and proceedings arising
under the Interstate Pact on Juveniles.229 This court also has ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over an adult charged with commit-
ting an act "causing a child to be adjudicated neglected, delin-
quent, or in need of supervision." '' Additionally, under special
circumstances the Division for Juvenile Causes may have juris-
diction to hear custody, guardianship 2 1 and paternity proceed-
ings. 23 Should we not consider the idea of a Family Court which
would combine the function of dealing with children who are in
trouble with the function of dealing with marital trouble and all
of its related problems?
First, it is necessary to determine what is meant by a Family
Court. There are a number of courts in the United States which
style themselves as "Family Courts," but, in actuality, they are
not. These courts may be simply "juvenile courts enlarged to
apply social service principles to other family members and mat-
ters." 4 A Family Court is a unified court having jurisdiction to
hear and determine all justiciable controversies and disputes re-
garding problems that involve members of a family. Such a court
is referred to as an "integrated" Family Court.225 Further, this
type of court is a centralized one with all of its parts located in
214. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-602(a) (1974). Although the statute
provides that paternity proceedings are equitable in nature, the practice continues in
Baltimore City of holding such proceedings in Criminal Court Number Eight. At the
commencement of a paternity proceeding, the bailiff for the Criminal Court announces
that the court is sitting in equity.
215. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(b) (Supp. 1973).
216. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(e) (Supp. 1973).
217. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-801(e) (1974).
218. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-804(a) (1974); see In re Carter and
Spaulding, 20 Md. App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (1974).
219. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-804(a)(5) (1974).
220. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3.804(b) (1974).
221. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-805(a) (1974).
222. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-806 (1974).
223. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-807 (1974).
224. Alexander, The Family Court -An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. PIr. L. REv. 602,
603 (1958).
225. Virtue, What is a Family Court?, 37 MICH. ST. B.J. 14 (1958); see Standard
Family Court Act, 5 NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 97 (1959).
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one place. As a consequence of this consolidation, the Family
Court must be staffed by experienced personnel who are able to
make appropriate referrals to the particular units under the aegis
of the court.
An integrated Family Court in Baltimore City should have
jurisdiction over all family related matters. The new court's juris-
diction would thus encompass those matters currently heard in
the Division for Juvenile Causes of the Circuit Court, the Domes-
tic Relations Court and the Criminal Court Part Eight. Further-
more, the Family Court would be the appropriate forum for any
crimes of an intrafamilial nature such as child abuse and assault
and battery. 26 Cases arising under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act 27 would also come within the jurisdic-
tion of the Family Court. Additionally, such a court would as-
sume control over all related agencies. Thus, the Adoption and
Custody Unit would no longer be under the dual control of the
Department of Juvenile Services and the Domestic Relations
Court, but would be placed within the authority of the Family
Court.
In addition to integrated jurisdiction, another trademark of
a Family Court is its expertise. This type of court is presided over
by judges who are specialists in the field of family relations. The
rotational system of the Supreme Bench, as concerns this particu-
lar type of problem, is unsatisfactory per se because, while judges
rotate, problems remain. The matter of divorce, for example, is
but a temporary stop of the train: the subsequent modification
problems keep rolling. Remaining to be dealt with are questions
pertaining to subsequent increase or decrease of alimony, child
support, visitation and custody. Disposition of such modification
proceedings may well involve testimony given in the original pro-
ceeding-testimony taken long before the current judge attempts
to solve the latest manifestation of the fundamental problem.2 ,
The current judge must either take testimony anew, which is time
consuming and duplicative, or ask the former presiding judge to
226. Even though wife beating, for example, may technically constitute the crime
of assault and battery, a civil remedy may be more appropriate. The District of Columbia
has recognized this preference by providing for a civil protection order and required partic-
ipation in a psychiatric treatment and counseling program. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1006
(Supp. 1970).
227. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89C, §§ 1 et seq. (1969); see Altemus v. Altemus, 18 Md.
App. 273, 306 A.2d 581 (1973).
228. Different attorneys may also be involved in the subsequent problems which
occur after the divorce. See MD. R. P. 125e (automatically terminating the appearance of
counsel upon final decree of divorce).
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hear and determine the existing problem. The former judge may
be loath to redetermine such matters since he will, in all probabil-
ity, then be assigned to a different court with different substan-
tive problems. 229 The structure of the Family Court eliminates
this problem by abolishing the rotational system. The permanent
assignment of judges to the Family Court would foster both the
development of expertise and familiarity with specific family-
related issues. It may also produce a permanent tyrant, but care
in appointment 2 0 plus existing removal procedures23' should min-
imize this possibility.
A successful Family Court requires the permanent and scru-
pulous keeping of adequate records and the prompt and system-
atic exchange of information among the various divisions of the
229. Even if the former judge is gracious enough to interrupt his present docket and
hear the current unrelated domestic problems, such problems may involve former situa-
tions which are naturally hazy in his memory, and, therefore, unsatisfactory decisions may
ensue.
230. Maryland recently adopted the "Missouri Plan" for the selection of its judges.
Exec. Order of July 17, 1970, [1973] Md. Laws 1973 (trial court judicial selection). Under
this plan, each of Maryland's eight judicial circuits now has a "Governor's Commission
on Trial Court Judicial Selection," composed of eleven members: five are attorneys
elected by the appropriate local Bar Association and six are appointed by the Governor
from the general public. The Commission submits a list of attorneys suitable for judicial
appointment to the Governor whenever a vacancy occurs in the circuit. The plan is
believed to best "assist the Governor in carrying out his desire and intent to appoint to
judicial offices on the trial court only those members of the Bar who are, by virtue of their
learning, experience, character and temperament best fitted therefor." Id. Under the prior
system, the appropriate Bar Association would submit a list of names, sometimes as many
as twenty or more, to the Governor who would generally appoint from this list. It was felt
that the old system left too much to "judicial politics" and did not give the general public
any say in judicial selection.
231. Judges in Maryland may now be removed through the Commission on Judicial
Disabilities. This Commission, appointed by the Governor, may receive and investigate
complaints against Judges, conduct formal hearings, and recommend to the Court of
Appeals removal or retirement of a judge. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4A, 4B; MD. ANN. CODE,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., §§ 13-401 et seq. (1974). The Maryland Court of Appeals,
after a hearing and upon a finding of misconduct while in office, or of persistent
failure to perform the duties of his office, or of conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice, may remove the judge from office or may censure him,
or the Court of Appeals, after hearing and upon a finding of disability which is or
is likely to become permanent and which seriously interferes with the performance
of his duties, may retire the judge from office.
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(b). This procedure is "alternative to, and cumulative with, the
methods of retirement and removal provided in Sections 3 and 4 of this Article [Art. IV],
and in Section 26 of Article mH of this Constitution." MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(c). Section
4 permits removal "on conviction ... of incompetency, of wilful neglect of duty, misbe-
havior in office, or any other crime, or on impeachment . . . or on the address of the
General Assembly .. " MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Section 3 allows a judge to be retired
by the General Assembly with approval of the Governor for "inability .... to discharge
his duties with efficiency, by reason of continued sickness, or of physical or mental infirm-
ity." MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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court. 3' This procedure eliminates duplication and enables each
interested unit of the Family Court to maintain a current and
informed position on any particular problem. Thus, if there is
juvenile trouble that comes to the attention of the Juvenile Divi-
sion of the Family Court, that information would automatically
be brought to the attention of all other Divisions. It may also be
that the Domestic Relations Division has had or might, in the
future, have contact with the family of the particular juvenile,
and the need for counseling might be determined earlier than it
would under a non-integrated system. Further, where divorce ac-
tions are instituted in the Domestic Relations Division, detailed
data should be taken and correlated immediately with the Juve-
nile and other Divisions. In this way, all Divisions might be made
aware of pertinent information that could benefit the children of
the divorce action, and an informed investigation could be made.
The procedures involved in a Family Court must be carefully
analyzed. The court should function "in cooperation with private
and community facilities. 233 Counseling and conciliation would
not be mandatory but would be available through the Family
Court.2 34 The divorce action should be instituted with the title In
Re the marriage of Mary and John Jones instead of Mary Jones
v. John Jones. There would be an initial mandatory interview to
ascertain the situation of the parties and to explain to them the
facilities of the Family Court.
There may be criticism that courts really cannot settle fam-
ily problems, and, therefore, the concept of the Family Court is
without merit. However, there are certain family areas, such as
divorce, which require judges to determine both property rights
and support obligations and to enforce legal rights. In addition,
judges are controlled by the appellate corrective process (to say
nothing of legislative correction) which provides safeguards
against judicial excess in regard to familial situations. Thus, the
Family Court is a desirable innovation; for, as Professor Kay
writes, it "appears more appropriate to provide courts with nonle-
gal techniques and personnel than to supply legal authority to
nonjudicial agencies even if they are better equipped to deal with
the primarily emotional problems of family dissolution.' ' 2 5
232. The records should be centrally located and not dispersed to the various agen-
cies and units. The cost of such a system of record-keeping and its effectiveness is readily
ascertainable. See 0. GLASER, ROUTINIZING EVALUATION: GETTING FEEDBACK ON EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS (HEW Pub. No. 73-9123, 1973).
233. Kay, supra note 194, at 1225.
234. Id. at 1226-27.




The emerging recognition of the rights of children warrants
full consideration of appropriate methods to implement such
rights.
One method is the use of a guardian ad litem within the
framework of a Family Court. It is submitted that even without
a Family Court, there should be mandatory use of such guardians
in hotly contested custody cases or in any other situations where
the judge feels that one is necessary. Certainly this is true as long
as Maryland retains fault and the adversary system in its divorce
machinery. If Maryland were to rid itself of the fault concept,
then the drive for a guardian ad litem might lose some of its
urgency. However, the removal of fault will produce a dangerous
gap which, it is submitted, should be filled with a fully integrated
Family Court: a court with specialized nonrotating judges, a pro-
fessional staff and jurisdiction to determine all justiciable contro-
versies relating to members of a family.
The basic thrust of the Family Court concept is that it will
provide an individual with the ability to more deeply understand
himself and an opportunity to see better how he "presents himself
to others." 3 " It is felt that this approach will be constructive to
the marriage and to the children of the marriage. If so, the value
of the Family Court would be established because the family and
its continued existence are of fundamental concern to society.237
However, the flywheel ought to have another thrust, a recog-
nition that if a marriage is truly "dead," it should be decently
interred2 3 regardless of whether there are children.2 39 If this is so
determined by the professional staff and the judge after due con-
sideration, then let the divorce ensue. We then will know that we
have done our best.24
0
236. E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE passim (1959).
237. Parsons, The Normal American Family in MAN AND CIVILIZATION: THE FAMILY'S
SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL 37 (S. Farber ed. 1965).
238. Harper & Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Counseling, 1 J. FAMILY L. 73, 74
(1961).
239. Landis, The Family and Social Change: A Positive View, in MAN AND CIVILIZA-
TION: THE FAMILY'S SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL 179-80 (S. Farber ed. 1965); see also Nye, Child
Adjustment in Broken and Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 MARRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING 356
(1957).
240. Kay, supra note 194, at 1248.
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